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ABSTRACT

In the early twentieth century winegrowersin Europe faced a crisis of overproduction, with steeply falling prices and sharp increases in wages and production costs. Since the markets showed no signs of correcting themselves, the winegrowers called for state intervention. In the major wine producing countries such as France and Spain, large winegrowers' associations were created which lobbied their governments to regulate domestic wine markets through tariffs, quality controls, the creation of regional appellations and bodies investigating fraud in winemaking, and also promoted other measures to increase the consumption of unadulterated wine. However, while winegrowers in France were highly successful in obtaining government support to protect their market interests, in Spain the legislation introduced was much more eclectic; it aimed to satisfy on the one hand the winegrowers and on the other the alcohol producers, wine merchants and exporters, even though the interests of these groups often clashed head on. This paper aims to explain the differences in state intervention and wine market regulation in these two major producer countries in the early twentieth century, by analysing the particular features of their markets and productive systems in the aftermath of the phylloxera plague, as well as the winegrowers' collective action and the political framework in each country.

Keywords: state intervention, market regulation, winegrowers, collective action, France, Spain.

RESUMEN

A comienzos del siglo XX, los viticultores tuvieron que enfrentarse a una crisis internacional de sobreproducción, con una caída pronunciada de los precios del vino mientras los salarios y los costes de producción se incrementaban. Ante la falta de autoregulación de los mercados, los viticultores pidieron la intervención del estado. En los principales países productores de vino, como eran Francia y España, se crearon grandes asociaciones de viticultores que presionaron al gobierno para lograr la regulación de los mercados domésticos con aranceles, reglamentaciones de la calidad del producto, denominaciones de origen, organismos para controlar el fraude en la producción del vino y otras medidas. Sin embargo, mientras que en Francia consiguieron que el gobierno atendiera sus demandas, en España la legislación fue mucho más ecléctica, intentando satisfacer a los viticultores y, al mismo tiempo, a los productores de alcohol, comerciantes y exportadores de vino, cuyos intereses eran a menudo opuestos. Este trabajo intenta explicar las diferencias en la regulación del mercado vinícola de estos dos países a comienzos del siglo XX, atendiendo a las características de sus mercados y sus sistemas productivos, así como a la acción colectiva de los viticultores y el marco político en cada país.

Palabras clave: intervencionismo estatal, regulación del mercado, viticultores, acción colectiva, Francia, España.

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STATE INTERVENTION IN WINE MARKETS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN FRANCE AND SPAIN DURING THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY*

1. Introduction

In the early twentieth century, new regulatory measures were introduced in agricultural markets. The nature of state intervention also changed: governments not only used trade policy to protect domestic markets through tariffs and quotas so as to reduce imports, but they also introduced regulations on quality, quantity and prices in the domestic markets. In fact, trade policy gradually took second place inside the global state intervention in agricultural markets (Tracy, 1989; Koning, 1994 and 2013; Moser & Varley, 2013).

The wine sector provides a good illustration of this evolution, and indeed many of the current EU regulations in the wine market can be traced back to the French regulations of the early twentieth century (Meloni & Swinnen, 2013). In France, the main producer and consumer of wine, so many regulatory measures were introduced in the interwar period that viticulture came to be described as an "*économie dirigée*" (Morel, 1939). Initially these were legal measures to control the process of winemaking and to avoid imitations using alcohol, water and other products. Fraud had always been present in wine markets, since the poor quality of many wines made adulteration easy; but the growing physical separation between producers and consumers, the shortage of genuine wines caused by the phylloxera plague and other vine diseases, and the

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development of new techniques to mask food deterioration and to lower costs made sharp practices of this kind especially attractive for manufacturers and imperceptible to consumers (Simpson, 2011: 82).

Some of the regulations were introduced to protect consumers, by attempting to guarantee food quality standards in an environment in which, naturally, they had less information than the producers. However the regulations also affected income distribution in the French market and limited competition (Stanziani, 2003 and 2005). Legal measures were introduced to control the quality of wine in 1889, 1891, 1894, 1895 and 1905, and in 1907 crop declarations ("*déclaration de récolte*") were made compulsory in order to fight fraud in winemaking. Regarding the quality of wine, the regional appellations ("*Appellations d'Origine Contrôlées*"), passed in the legislation of 1905, 1919, 1935 were another way to avoid competition.

The state also intervened in the quantity of produce sold. In the 1930s, the French government tried to reduce wine overproduction not only by raising tariffs, but also by regulating the domestic market. The act of 4 July 1931 was considered "the most important legislative measure consecrating the intervention of the state in the domain of economic life since the French Revolution".[1] It was the first of a complex set of measures called the "*Statut de la Viticulture*" passed in the 1930s: in addition to the regulations regarding quality, the French government introduced quantity controls such as the prohibition of high-yield vines, the ceasing of irrigation of vineyards after 15 July each year, the storage of harvests in the farms and their release at stipulated intervals, mandatory distillation of wine surpluses, restrictions on planting vines, and even the pulling up of vines already planted. There was even a project to create a National Wine Agency ("*Office National du Vin*") to fix wine prices and output.

In Spain, price controls and restrictions on competition were also introduced in the early twentieth century, but regulations in the domestic market did not go so far. It was not until 1926 that a Wine Act was passed favouring winegrowers' interests, and even then the legislation was eclectic, aiming to satisfy winegrowers and alcohol producers, wine merchants and exporters all at the same time (Pan-Montojo & Puig, 1995). Crop declarations, which had been the winegrowers' main demand since 1912, were not introduced until 1931 when the wine crisis was at its peak, and they were not implemented until later; in France, on the other hand, they had been in place since 1907.

[1] Comment by M. Jean-Charles Leroy, Chef du Contentieux des appellations d'origine au Ministère de l'agriculture, *Annuaire de législation française*, 1932, p. 77 (cited in Warner, 1960: 155).

The first attempts to start joint management of viticultural policy in Spain were highly unsatisfactory for winegrowers, and it was difficult for them to reach agreements to protect their interests. Studies of Spain's wine market policy during the 1920s and 1930s have concluded that the winegrowers' lobby was a failure (Fernández, 2008). The aim of this paper is to explain why state intervention in wine markets differed so much in these two major wine producer countries; to do so, I examine the specific features of their markets and productive systems, the winegrowers' collective action, and the political framework in each country.

2. The early twentieth-century wine crisis

Since the 1860s, European winegrowers had had to contend with the destruction of large areas of vineyards by the phylloxera plague. The only long-term solution was to uproot the dead vines and substitute them with American vines, which were resistant to the disease. This was done by grafting (inserting European vines onto the roots of the American vine species) or by using hybrids (crossing two or more varieties of different vine species, either between American species or between European and American species). But uprooting and replanting vines was extremely costly,[2] and in fact the investment yielded little or no return, since in the early twentieth century the wine markets underwent several crises of overproduction and prices fell as a result. The new vines – especially the hybrids – produced higher yields, and the spread of phylloxera across the continent led to the emergence of new winegrowing areas to supply the wine markets.

Figure 1 shows the response of French winegrowers to the phylloxera plague: although the vine area was reduced by about 1 million hectares from 1870 to 1940, from 2.4 million (1871) to 1.4 million (1939), wine production increased; by the 1920s and 1930s, with a smaller area of planted vines, the wine production was larger. Supply and demand were difficult to match, as wine consumption was more or less constant and annual production fluctuated considerably. The consequence was a high price volatility that made the adjustment to the market conditions more difficult.[3]

[2] In France, between 1868 and 1900 about 2.5 million hectares of vines were uprooted at an estimated cost of 15 billion francs and another 20 billion were spent in replanting (Simpson, 2011: 36).

[3] In the 1930s, when the wine crisis was at its height and the wine prices very low, it was pointed out that "the problem with French winegrowing is not that the price is excessively low; it is that the price is excessively irregular" (Milhau, 1935: 77).

Figure 1. Area of vines and wine production in France and the Midi, 1871-1939



Source: Pech, 1975.

The four main winegrowing *départements* of the Midi (Aude, Gard, Hérault and Pyrenées-Orientales) did not reduce their vine areas and production increased much more than in France as a whole. The Midi was the first winegrowing region hit by phylloxera (in 1867, two municipalities in Hérault were already affected), and the replantation was carried out when wine prices were still high (Simpson, 2005 and 2011: 40), leading to an intensive vineyard monoculture. As I will argue later, the region's high specialization in winegrowing and its share of the national wine output had a major influence on the viticultural policies that were implemented in France.

The evolution of wine production was the consequence of the higher vine yields. Figure 2 shows the rapid increase in French vine yields since 1870: from 1870 to 1940, average yields nearly doubled, from 24 (1871) to 47 (1939) hectolitres per hectare, because the new vines were more productive, now the fertile plains were cultivated, and winegrowers used more fertilizers. Production costs increased as well, not just because of the replantation with new vines but because of the use of fertilizers and other costly inputs such as sulphur and copper sulphate needed to prevent the downy mildew and

other vine diseases, and also because of rising salaries. Consequently, after the replantation the running costs of winegrowing also increased.

Figure 2. Vine yields in France and the Midi, 1871-1939 (5-year averages)



Source: Pech, 1975.

The trend was similar in the Midi, where yields were even higher: they rose on average from 34 (1871) to 63 (1939) hectolitres per hectare, reaching 300 hectolitres in some areas (Augé-Laribé, 1950: 175). The replantation in the Midi was mainly carried out with aramon, a highly productive vine. More than in any other winegrowing region, production in the Midi was moving towards quantity at the expense of quality: its specialization in cheap table wines with highly homogeneous production was defined at the beginning of the twentieth century as an "industrialized agriculture" (Augé-Laribé, 1907). In the 1930s the four *départements* of the Midi accounted for about a third of the total extension of France's vineyards and nearly half of its total production of wine (Figure 3); the four *départements* of the Midi produced more wine than all Spain, with only one third of the vine area (Figures 1 and 4).

Figure 3a. Area of vines in the Midi and in Catalonia (% of the total in France and Spain)



Figure 3b. Wine production in the Midi and in Catalonia (% of the total in France and Spain)



Sources: Pech, 1975; GEHR, 1991.

This high degree of regional concentration (which had far-reaching consequences for the organization of winegrowers' interests) was not found in Spain (Figures 3 and 4). At the beginning of the twentieth century, Catalonia was Spain's main winegrowing region, but it had about 15% of the country's vines, and its wine production (less homogeneous than in the Midi) represented a similar proportion of the total. Its share rose until 1920, and then fell slightly; in the 1930s, it accounted for roughly 20% of Spain's wine production and a lower share of the area of vines (Figure 3). Throughout the period, other regions of Spain increased their specialization in winegrowing, especially La Mancha. In the 1930s, four provinces (Albacete, Ciudad Real, Cuenca and Toledo) concentrated 24% of all Spain's vines and produced wines at a much lower cost than Catalonia. To sum up, in contrast to France, the wine crisis did

not hurt a particular region so much, and therefore in Spain it was more difficult to mobilize winegrowers in order to lobby the government.

Furthermore, Catalonia had a much more diversified economy than the Midi. In the early twentieth century the province of Barcelona had the largest area of vines in Catalonia, but it was also highly industrialized. In contrast, Hérault, the *département* with the largest area of vines and wine production in France (the second in added value after Gironde) was highly dependent on wine: in the interwar period, 90% of its revenue came from vines and its main city, Montpellier (90,787 inhabitants in 1936, nearly a fifth of the total population of the *département*) was strongly linked to the wine economy, with many commercial businesses, but had little industry (Sagnes, 1986: 7-8). Nor were the wine sectors in the two regions comparable in terms of size: Languedoc-Roussillon, with a smaller surface area than Catalonia, had nearly twice as many vines and seven times its wine production.

Figure 4. Area of vines and wine production in Spain and Catalonia, 1898-1935



Source: GEHR, 1991.

In Spain vine yields were much lower than in France (between 15 and 20 hectolitres per hectare in average) and they increased little over the period. Consequently, even though the evolution of its vine areas was similar (albeit with a certain delay, because the phylloxera plague arrived later), wine production fell from 32 million hectolitres in 1889 to 17 million in 1935 (Figure 4). However, in the 1920s Spain was producing more than 25 million hectolitres and was on its way to a severe overproduction crisis.

Figure 5. Wine prices in France and Spain, 1890-1939 (1890=100)



Sources: Pech, 1975 and Singer-Kerel, 1961 (France); Colomé *et al*., 2013 (Spain).

Figure 5 shows the evolution of table wine prices in the two countries. Due to the market integration, the evolution is very similar, and despite annual harvest variations we note a clear downward trend from 1890 to 1939. Except for the period of the First World War, wine prices did not recover 1890 levels and were particularly low in 1905-10, 1920-25 and 1930-35, with severe "*crises de mévente*", when wine was sold at a loss because growers were unable to cut production costs to match the evolution of the prices (Pujol, 1985 and 1986). In Catalonia, from 1890 to 1922 there were thirteen such crises (1892, 1893, 1894, 1900, 1901, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1914, 1918, 1920, 1921), while in the forty years from 1850 to 1890 there had been none (Raventós, 1923).

The difficulties facing winegrowers in the early twentieth century can be better understood by looking at the changes in relative prices of wine and labour (Figure 6).

Nominal wages rose continuously and wine prices fluctuated, with dramatic falls in 1905-10, 1920-25 and 1930-35. Even though most of the winegrowers were family producers[4] who did not hire much labour except possibly for harvesting, the opportunity cost of growing vines increased rapidly, especially in the 1920s and 1930s. In other words, in contrast to the general increase in living standards, the winegrowers were becoming steadily poorer; their revenues fell, but their production costs did not.

Figure 6. Wine prices and wages in France, 1871-1939 (1871=100)



Source: Pech, 1975 (wine prices) and Bayet, 1997 (nominal wages).

These family producers had difficulty responding to the evolution of wine prices in order to match supply and demand. Firstly, wine prices varied significantly from one year to another, resulting from the fluctuations in output, and families who owned winemaking facilities were compelled to sell their produce to leave room for the next harvest. Secondly, even though prices were falling in the long term, it was difficult to halt wine production, because of the significant investment in planting and in winemaking facilities. Moreover, farmers were often unable to produce other crops due to the conditions of the land. In this situation, they often responded to falling prices by

[4] In 1935 there were 1,657,192 winegrowers in France, of whom 1,503,456 produced less than 100 hectolitres and 88,489 between 100 to 200 hectolitres; more than half of the vine area was owned by small landowners with between 5 and 10 hectares (Cellier, 1938: 14).

selling a greater amount of wine to increase their revenues, a practice which pushed the price down still further (Pan-Montojo, 1994: 210).

The evolution of relative prices of wine and wages followed a similar trend in Spain, with the exception of the 1870s and 1880s when the price rose much faster than wages due to the destruction of the French vineyards by phylloxera and the demand for exports to France (Simpson, 2011: 40). France was the largest wine producer and, at the same time, the largest consumer (more than 160 litres per capita in 1930s, even though then workers' consumption diminished because of the crisis), while Spain's per capita consumption, with much lower living standards, was below 100 litres (Morel, 1939; Robledo, 2012). Due to the spread of the phylloxera plague, from 1880 onwards France was a net importer, mainly from Spain in the 1880s and early 1890s and later on from Algeria, where vine plantations expanded massively (rising from 50,000 ha in 1885 to 175,000 ha in 1925, and to 400,000 ha in 1935) and wine production increased dramatically (1885: 1 M Hl; 1900: 5 M Hl; 1910: 10 M Hl; 1935: 20 M Hl), mainly for consumption in France; as a French colony, Algeria benefited from tariff-free entry for its products (Meloni & Swinnen, 2014).[5]

Not counting Algeria, in the early twentieth century Spain was still the world's leading exporter of ordinary table wines in terms of volume. However, the French market absorbed more than 60-70% of these exports, and the Spanish export sector was severely affected by France's increasingly protectionist policy from 1892 onwards. Most of these exports were wines of good colour and alcoholic content used for blending ("*coupage*") with low-strength wines from southern France, but in this function imports from Algeria soon began to replace Spanish wines. When the overproduction crisis worsened, the French government increased tariffs on wine imports and a law passed on 1 January 1930 laid down that foreign wines should be labelled to indicate the country of origin; it also banned their blending with French wines, which effectively prevented Spanish imports. Even though negotiations between the two countries continued, Spanish exports to France fell dramatically, from 2.8 M hl (1926-30) to 0.9 M hl (1931-35), while total Spanish table wine exports dropped from 3.7 M hl to 1.7 M hl (Pinilla & Ayuda, 2002).

[5] According to these authors, it was the growth of the Algerian wine industry that triggered the introduction of wine regulations in France at the beginning of the twentieth century, and especially in the 1930s (Meloni & Swinnen, 2014).

The pressure of the French winegrowers' organizations also played an important part in this evolution, as they lobbied the government to impose tariffs and quotas on wine imports. In Spain, the winegrowers' organizations took note and looked for solutions to the overproduction problem, mainly, as in France, via the regulation of the domestic market. In France as well exports were falling: they had reached four million hectolitres in the 1870s, but fell from two million hectolitres in the 1890s to less than one million in the 1930s. After the introduction of the tariff in 1892 French wine production grew, but the "artificial" expansion of vineyards favoured by protection led to overproduction and increased the difficulty of finding markets (Tracy, 1989:75).

Two other factors worsened the overproduction crisis. On the one hand, the development of the alcohol industry reduced opportunities for wine distillation, which had traditionally functioned as a safety valve for large harvests and low prices.[6] On the other, there was growing competition from "artificial" wines in the markets. The phylloxera crisis caused shortages and boosted the production of beverages that imitated wine, like *piquettes*,[7] wines produced from dried grapes instead of fresh grapes, and poor quality beverages produced with industrial alcohol and other substances at rock bottom prices.

Before the fall of the wine prices, France and Spain had used industrial alcohol produced from sugar beets and potato spirits to fortify wines, and Spain imported large amounts of industrial alcohol (especially from Germany) in order to be able to export wines to France and also for its domestic market. But when overproduction started to affect the wine markets, the competition from these "artificial" wines – even if most of them were harmless to health – was seen by winegrowers as a fraud that needed to be prosecuted. In addition, wines were taxed on entering the municipalities. These taxes not only raised prices and limited consumption, but also encouraged forgery, which was carried out in the cities. In Spain these taxes were removed in 1915, but three years later they were reintroduced as municipalities protested at the loss of this important revenue. In France, in contrast, they were reduced in 1893 and finally abolished in 1915 (Fernández, 2008: 119).

[6] In Spain, industrial alcohol production grew rapidly after the loss of its colony Cuba. Sugar beet expanded in order to avoid dependence on importations from the island and the residues of sugar manufacturing were used to produce alcohol, since animal husbandry was much more limited than in other countries and so these residues were of little use to feed livestock. Industrial alcohol was also produced with corn, which was imported mainly from Argentina for cattle breeding or for distillation.

[7] A vinous beverage produced by adding sugar, together with hot water, to the remains of the grapes after the first pressing, and then repressed. The process was called "*chaptalisation*" because it was described by the French chemist Jean-Antoine Chaptal (1765-1832).

3. The winegrowers mobilize

Winegrowers faced important constraints on their ability to deal with the crisis. In a very volatile market, with the large-scale intervention of merchants and a product that was easy to imitate, the growers were very numerous and disorganized. Collective action represented a major change, prompted by the wine crisis. It is not surprising that the winegrowers' mobilization started in the Midi of France, where after the phylloxera plague winegrowing had developed into an intensive monoculture of high yielding vines (aramon) throughout almost all of the cultivated land. The depreciation of wine was also more severe in the Midi than anywhere else in France (Figure 7), and the region's high specialization in winegrowing meant that the effects of the crisis were particularly keenly felt.

In 1907, after several "*crises de mévente*" – large harvests and very low wine prices – there was a widespread uprising of winegrowers in the Midi: "the most spectacular peasant mobilization of the Third Republic, recalling in terms of its size the *jacqueries* of earlier times" (Barral, 1969: 11). There were mass demonstrations (the one in Montpellier on 9 June attracted around half a million people), the resignation of many town councils, tax strikes and even street violence, with a clash with soldiers in Narbonne (19-20 June) resulting in casualties.

The winegrowers had started to mobilize in the 1890s. Their major complaints were directed against the passivity of the government with the prosecution of fraud in winemaking, since even the antifraud legislation passed in 1905 was useless without strict control and enforcement of the law. The winegrowers believed that the Midi economy was being sacrificed in favour of the sugar beet and alcohol producers in the north, and of the wine merchants of the Bercy district in Paris. Due to the region's high specialization in winegrowing and winemaking, this was a cross-class movement defending wine prices and the prohibition of artificial wines (Lachiver, 1988: 474; Gavignaud-Fontaine, 1997).

The nature of this movement is particularly interesting, because since the late nineteenth century a powerful class-based peasant syndicalism had also emerged in the Midi in response to the development of vineyard capitalism. In 1903 a federation was established, affiliated to the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, comprising 31 unions from Languedoc-Roussillon and with a membership of around 3,000 (Gavignaud-Fontaine, 1997: 329). From November 1903 to July 1904 about 150 strikes were carried out, involving about 50,000 workers (Caupert, 1921: 28). Significant gains were

achieved in terms of both increases in wages and reductions in working hours, and numerous unions were created. Nevertheless, within three years, membership had fallen sharply (1904: 14,804; 1905: 9,747; 1906: 4,470; 1907: 1,721)[8], and in 1907 agricultural workers were also participating in the cross-class protest against fraud in winemaking. As Frader pointed out, "the fact that many rural workers had been (or remained) landowners, or that numerous poor small vineyard owners became part-time or even full-time workers, made the class status of vinedressers extremely complex" (Frader, 1991: 166).

Later, the Midi uprising became a symbol of the winegrowers' resistance against the authorities and when the "*députés du vin*" from Hérault called for protection for small-scale winegrowers, they often recalled the risks of social unrest and harked back to the events of 1907 (Bagnol, 2010: 91). The Midi revolt probably had long-term consequences, as "a permanent feature of French policy was the importance given to social stability […] and at preserving social peace for fear of peasants' riots" (Vivier, 2008: 74).

In the short term, the revolt had two important consequences. Firstly, the French government took the winegrowers' protest seriously and, as fraudulent manufacture or sale of wine was one of their main complaints, on 29 June 1907 legislation was passed requiring crop declaration ("*declaration de récolte*"), and imposing a high tax on sugar destined to winemaking (*chaptalisation*) and its prohibition in the Midi *départements.* Other measures to restrict wine adulteration were introduced by a second law passed on 15 July 1907. Although since 1889 the use of products other than fresh grapes to produce wine had been banned (Stanziani, 2003), malpractice was difficult to prosecute. Once crop declarations were introduced by law, all winegrowers (except for very small vineyards) were required to declare, every year before 5 December, the exact number of hectares of vineyards in production, the number of hectolitres harvested and the stocks of previous years. Wine distribution licences were already necessary for any trading activity. Legislation made it possible to establish the exact situation of the wine production in each *département* and, thus, to determine the degree of adulteration in the market. This was the first important regulatory measure introduced by the French

[8] *Fédération des travailleurs agricoles du Midi* membership (Frader, 1991: 127).

government; nevertheless, it was insufficient to resolve the overproduction crisis, and it is doubtful that fraud was the sole cause of the situation (Paul, 1996: 261).[9]

The second consequence was the creation of a permanent association of Midi winegrowers. In September 1907 five large agricultural syndicates,[10]which had been created during the winegrowers' uprising, set up the General Confederation of Winegrowers (*Confédération Générale des Vignerons*, CGV). In its local delegations (*sections communales*) this organization grouped together large and small landowners, tenants, leaseholders and agricultural workers, as well as traders and members of professions related to the production and marketing of wine. In 1908 there were nearly 70,000 members from 700 viticultural municipalities, which were responsible for about half of French wine production.[11] From 1922, with the adhesion of the Confederation of South-East Winegrowers (an organization based on the *départements* of Gard, Ardèche, Vaucluse, Bouches-du-Rhône and Var), the CGV had more than 100,000 members and was active in eight *départements*, from the Pyrénées Orientales to the Var (Roche-Agussol, 1924: 38).

The syndicates of the CGV had two main goals: a) to seek out fraud and to take any action which might lead to its prosecution; and b) to propose legislative reforms or economic measures to defend the economic and social interests of its members. Regarding the first goal, the CGV was not the first association to try to prosecute fraud on its own, in the face of the ineffectiveness of public efforts. In 1902, the *Société des Viticulteurs de France (et d'Ampélographie*, later on), located in Paris, created a *Syndicat national de défense de la viticulture* to collaborate in fraud prosecution (Augé-Laribé, 1950: 186). It continued its activities after the creation of the CGV (Roche-Agussol, 1924: 43), but it lacked financial resources. The CGV had the means to be much more successful: on the one hand, the extended organization in local sections of the syndicates was essential for the prosecution of fraud; on the other hand, it enjoyed financial resources far in excess of those of other agricultural associations of the time, provided by a dual source of income: a fixed nominal contribution of 0.25 francs per year from every member, plus an additional contribution proportional to the harvests, so

[9] For Pech, singling out fraud as the cause of the crisis "made it possible to lay the blame on a relatively abstract group, the fraudsters, and by placing the debate in the moral plane, to avoid the problem of the distribution of revenues and that of the class struggle" (Pech, 1975: 79).
[10]The syndicates of Montpellier, Béziers, Narbonne, Perpignan and Carcassonne from the *départements* of Hérault, Aude and Pyrénées Orientales.
[11]*Vendémiaire*, 15.5.1908 and 1.7.1908.

that large winegrowers paid more.[12]

The French legislation enabled the agricultural syndicates to prosecute fraud in court, and the CGV took full advantage. From 1907 to 1920 the number of agents paid by the CGV to pursue fraud in the whole territory of France (including Algeria) rose from twelve to thirty-two. In 1920 the CGV budget for the repression of fraud was 500,000 francs while the sum assigned to this task by the government was 600,000 francs (Caupert, 1921). In 1912 the government assigned the CGV antifraud agents able to inspect vineyards and test wine for sugar content under the direct authority of the Ministry of Agriculture, thus initiating a system of close collaboration between the winegrowers' organizations and the state. Another major contribution to stopping fraud in winemaking was the commitment of all CGV members to prevent adulteration. Thanks to the crop declarations, each local section was able to control the total amount of wine that was to be produced in the municipality according to its vine area, and in 1908 the CGV created a label to be used as a quality trademark for commercialization.[13]

Regarding its second goal, the CGV paid close attention to the activities of members of parliament regarding the wine market, and it was continually involved in proposing legislation affecting trade in wine and viticulture, often in cooperation with other regional associations and members of parliament representing the winegrowing regions of France (Simpson, 2005). The CGV was consulted on the preparation of all legislative measures; for decades, it was closely associated with the government (Pech, 1993: 24) and was well represented in the public organisms in charge of the wine market regulations. According to Caupert, "it was no exaggeration to say that [the CGV] fulfilled the role of a true Parliament of Viticulture" (Caupert, 1921: 113).

The mobilization of winegrowers to defend their interests and the increasing enforcement of anti-fraud laws was reflected in the evolution of wine prices (Figure 7). After 1907 there were some lighter harvests (especially in 1910 when only 28.5 million hectolitres were produced in France because of a mildew attack) which contributed to the price rise, but from that time onwards prices clearly improved in the Midi in relation to the national average (Warner, 1960: 48):

[12] In the 1920s, the additional contribution was 0.10 francs per hectolitre of wine (Roche-Agussol, 1924:36).
[13] *Vendémiaire*, 1.10.1908.

Figure 7. Wine prices in France and the Midi, 1890-1913 (francs per hectolitre)

	(a) France	(b) Midi*	(a – b)
1900	19	7	12
1901	16	5	11
1902	21	10	11
1903	27	25	2
1904	19	6	13
1905	15	7	8
1906	18	6	12
1907	17	9	8
1908	16	12	4
1909	18	15	3
1910	39	37	2
1911	30	26	4
1912	30	25	5
1913	34	28	6
1890-99 average	29	16	13
1900-07 average	19	9	10
1908-13 average	28	24	4

Source: Warner, 1960: 20 and 48.
* *Départements* of Pyrénées-Orientales, Aude, Hérault and Gard.

The success of the CGV triggered many imitations in other wine-producing areas, which also contributed to the government's increasing preoccupation with the winegrowers' demands. In 1908 the *Confédération des Associations Viticoles de Bourgogne* was founded, with 33,000 members, and expressed "their wish to enter constant and regular relations" with the CGV.[14] On 12 September 1908 the winegrowers in Charente created the *Fédération des viticulteurs des Deux-Charentes*, based in Cognac, and in the Champagne region winegrowers started to organize their own federation.[15]In 1909 the *Confédération des Viticulteurs du Sud-Est* was founded in Nimes, based on the *départements* of Gard, Vaucluse, Bouches-du Rhône and Var, with 10,000 members in 1912)[16], and later the *Confédération des Vignerons des Trois Départements Algériens* (1912) and the *Ligue des Viticulteurs de la Gironde* also came into being.

In 1913 the CGV promoted the foundation of the Federation of Regional

[14]*Vendémiaire*, 1.10.1908.
[15] In 1911 winegrowers revolted in Champagne, because of the delimitation of the regional appellation. In Bordeaux this issue also sparked a public outcry (Lachiver, 1988; Simpson, 2005).
[16]Starting in September 1908, the CGV held meetings with the agricultural organizations in the other Mediterranean *départements*: the *Société Central d'Agriculture du Gard, Fédération des Syndicats Agricoles du Gard, Association Agricole du Bas-Rhône, Fédération des Syndicats du Var* (*Vendémiaire*, 15.9.1908).

Winegrowers Associations of France (*Fédération des Associations Viticoles Régionales de France*), based in Narbonne, and in 1919 it also played a leading role in the creation of the National Confederation of Agricultural Associations of France (*Confédération Nationale des Associations Agricoles de France*), after the first French Agricultural Conference (Caupert, 1921: 73). But this confederation met with little success as the associations were unwilling to obey the central body, and the CGV even abandoned it for some time (Augé-Laribé, 1950: 444); it had to defend too many different interests in order to formulate a coherent set of demands and at the same time satisfy the different agricultural producers. In contrast, following the example of the winegrowing associations, other specialized agricultural federations were set up: the *Confédération Générale des Planteurs de Betteraves* (1921), *Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé* (1924) *Confédération Générale des Producteurs de Lait* (1924), *Confédération Générale des Producteurs de Viande* in the late 1920s and the *Confédération générale des producteurs de fruits et légumes* in 1932.

The creation of specialized agricultural associations proved to be a very effective formula for attracting farmers' support since it bypassed the political, social and economic divisions between them, and also for lobbying in Parliament to defend their members' interests since it allowed formulation of a precise set of demands (Wright, 1964: 36). Although they were controlled by large landowners, as was the CGV, they were able to enlist many small farmers and claim to speak for them. Moreover, the specialized associations introduced a new system of "professional" representation of agricultural interests that differed from the two traditional models of French agricultural syndicalism (the "rue d'Athènes" and "boulevard Saint Germain");[17] it was particularly active during the corporatist regime of Vichy, and then became consolidated after the Second World War (Pesche, 2000: 90).

The example of CGV was followed not only in France. In Catalonia, after several "*crises de mévente*" (1905, 1907, 1908, 1909) with wine sold at a loss, the association of Catalan winegrowers was founded (the *Unió de Vinyaters de Catalunya*: UVC). The first general conference was held in Barcelona on 17-18 February 1912. The large representation of the CGV at the presidential table bore witness to the French organization's influence. Previously, there had been contacts between the two organizations and in 1911 the UVC sent one of its board members to the CGV

[17]See Barral, 1968.

conference held in Montpellier, to meet their leaders. Now, the French delegates brought a very simple message to Barcelona: "By means of the UVC you will be able to obtain in your country the wonderful results that the CGV has achieved in France".[18]One of the conclusions approved at this first meeting was the establishment of crop declarations and wine distribution licences in Spain, as already existed in France. But the demand did not receive the unanimous support of the conference. On seeing this response, one of the representatives of the CGV argued that in France they had also been afraid of losing some freedom at the beginning, but he added that after its implementation they had seen that the honest producer had nothing to fear and that these measures were a guarantee against fraud.[19] In June 1912, at the request of the UVC board, the CGV sent a report on their effectiveness in the French legislation, which was translated into Catalan and published in the UVC's bulletin.[20]

The demand for crop declarations and wine distribution licences was ratified at the second annual UVC conference in 1913, although it again included an amendment that was rejected without any discussion. Around the same time, an eminent winegrower published a booklet arguing against the measures, quoting opinions compiled in France against state intervention. The author claimed to be an enthusiastic member of the UVC and an admirer of its board, but he was convinced that "they are leading us along a path which will seriously damage the interests of winegrowers, especially small winegrowers, and from which, once undertaken, there will be no turning back" (Raventós, 1913: 5). Raventós was not the only member of the UVC to hold this opinion. Later on, he bitterly accused the UVC board of preventing debate on the issue.[21]

In fact, there was strong disagreement between the two main agrarian organizations in Catalonia on these interventionist measures. According to the main landowners' association (the *Institut Agrícola Català de Sant Isidre*, IACSI), the solution to the wine crisis was to be found in the tax-free distillation of wines to reduce overproduction, and in the taxation of sugar and industrial alcohol to prevent its

[18]Letter from Jules Pastre, president of the Regional Syndicate of Béziers-Saint Pons, CGV (*Boletín de la Cámara Agrícola Oficial de Igualada y su Comarca*, 1.1912).
[19]Letter from H. Carcassonne, president of the Regional Syndicate of Pyrénées-Orientales, CGV (*El Vinyater*, 3.1912).
[20] *El Vinyater*, 17 and 18 (1912).
[21] *La Vanguardia*, 17.9.1918.

competition in the wine market (IACSI, 1915).[22] The organization's members feared that crop declarations and wine distribution licences would lead to an increase in taxation, and opposed them as representing an attack on free trade and excessive control and taxation on agriculture: "any restriction, any disincentive, any regulation that involves and implies distrust in the mode of action of citizens, should be dismissed because of the obstacles and humiliations that it imposes, because of the unnecessary expenses that it causes, because of the taxes it requires, which reduce the effectiveness of work and, therefore, increase the cost of production, thereby inflicting serious damage on the national wealth" (IACSI, 1918). For the IACSI, the wine crisis was not caused by fraud, but rather by under consumption and low exports.

The differences in opinion between the main agrarian associations weakened the winegrowers' lobby. Consequently, the Spanish government was under no pressure to legislate effectively on the issue. It also faced opposition from other very powerful sectors such as the industrial alcohol manufacturers, liquor producers and wine exporters, who feared a loss of competitiveness if wine prices rose. A bill was presented in parliament in 1918, when the Catalan politician Francesc Cambó was a member of the government, but it was not passed. In 1925 the establishment of crop declarations and wine distribution licences was still on the Spanish winegrowers' agenda, but their leaders had to admit that this measure had caused considerable debate and was not unanimously supported by all its members (CNV, 1925: 24-25).

In Spain, the first group to follow the example of the UVC were the winegrowers of Navarre, who founded their association in 1912. Their leader had attended the UVC's first conference in Barcelona in February 1912, and he invited all the participants to a meeting to be held in Pamplona in July of the same year, where "the union of all winegrowers in Spain could begin".[23] At this conference, which was convened jointly with the UVC, it was agreed to establish a Winegrowers' Federation of the North-East of Spain comprising the regional associations of Catalonia, Navarre, La Rioja (where, following the examples of Catalonia and Navarre, a similar Winegrowers' Association was founded in the same year), Aragon, and the Balearic Islands. Other federations were to be set up in eastern and central Spain (in La Mancha, Valencia and Murcia), the south (in Andalucía and Extremadura) and the north-west (in Galicia,

[22] Since the first law on alcohol (1888), wine distillation was to be declared and taxed, and became less and less competitive in relation to industrial alcohols. On this law, see Pan-Montojo, 1994: 212-229.

[23] From the speech of Mariano Arrasate, president of the Winegrowers' Association of Lumbier, at the UVC's first conference (*La Vanguardia*, 18.2.1912).

Asturias and León). Together, they were to constitute the National Confederation of Winegrowers of Spain.

But the Spanish Confederation (*Confederación Nacional de Viticultores*, CNV) was not founded until November 1924, just after the creation of the Winegrowers' Federation of Levante (Valencia). The Levante organization was the largest and most important association in the country, with 150 syndicates and around 25,000 members, that is, "all the wine cooperatives and agricultural syndicates in the region" (Carrión, 1971: 388). Along with the Levante federation the CNV comprised the UVC, with 120 syndicates and 20,000 members, and the Federation of Agricultural Syndicates of La Rioja, with 15,000 members, as well as other agricultural associations from Navarre, La Mancha and Castile.[24]

The CNV was founded two months after the Spanish government's decree on alcohols (1 September 1924), which the winegrowers considered to be highly unsatisfactory; they stepped up their protest to force its repeal and reorganized their mobilization. It had taken more than ten years to create the Confederation, in an atmosphere of growing discontent. As the leaders recognized in 1925, they faced great organizational difficulties: "if winegrowers had not been so disorganized so many years, so many obstacles and taxes on wine and alcohol would not have accumulated, adulteration and falsification of wine would have not been tolerated, and the competition of industrial alcohol would not have reached the proportions it has reached today" (CNV, 1925: 6).

4. State intervention in wine markets: why did Spain and France differ so much?

Primo de Rivera's *coup d'état* in 1923 was welcomed by several agrarian organizations. Some of them had been alarmed by the violent outbreak of rural conflict in the 'Bolshevik Triennium' of 1918-1920, and they were also angered by what they denounced as the pro-industrial economic policy during the First World War (Pan-Montojo, 2008: 126). Winegrowers' associations expected a more far-reaching intervention of the state in the wine domestic market and, especially, the enforcement of laws for the protection of natural wine. They were well aware of the ineffectiveness of the existing laws to prevent wine adulteration, as the main legislation had been passed

[24] AHN, Fondos Contemporáneos, Presidencia de Gobierno Primo de Rivera, 212-2: Copia de la instancia que eleva al Excmo. Sr. Presidente del Directorio Militar, la C.N.V. (Valencia, 11.2.1925).

as long ago as 1895 and a great deal had changed since then to make manipulation easier: for instance, the increase in beet cultivation (and sugar production) in many regions, the development of transport and communications and, especially, the technological advances in enology, which permitted sophisticated adulterations that were very difficult to detect (Sanz Lafuente, 2013). Even so, the enforcement of the law would have been sufficient to prevent adulterations at the level of retail trade (in taverns, inns, etc.), which was also ineffectively regulated.

The winegrowers were very soon disappointed with the new regime. The 1924 decree on Alcohols permitted the use of industrial alcohol for beverages when harvests were not large; this had never been authorized before, even though the law was not eventually enforced. According to the Association of Catalan natural alcohol manufacturers, Spain produced about 400,000 hl of industrial alcohol for beverages (extracted from corn, sugar beet, molasses, pods, and products other than wine and its residues): they argued that if this amount were produced through wine distillation, 4 million hl of wine would be consumed and its price would rise. As in other nations (France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Argentina), the legislation prevented the use of industrial alcohol for beverages; nevertheless, according to them "in those countries the laws affecting public health are strictly observed, but in Spain, until today, we have shown an excessive mastery in failing to abide by them".[25] These demands, however, were opposed by the wine exporters, who called for "the continuation of the use of industrial alcohols obtained from exclusively national raw materials for the same purposes as "wine-based" alcohols, and for domestic consumption".[26]

In France, after the Agreement of Béziers between winegrowers and beetgrowers in 1922, the government banned the use of industrial alcohol for beverages. In Spain, on the other hand, wine exporters and industrial alcohol manufacturers strongly opposed this measure; the government feared that the prohibition would harm these other sectors and did not know how to compensate them. These groups were also starting to organize in defence of their interests; they were less numerous than the winegrowers and were easier to coordinate in order to lobby the government. In 1922, wine merchants and exporters had created the *Asociación Nacional de Vinicultores e Industrias Derivadas*

[25] AHN, Fondos Contemporáneos, Presidencia de Gobierno Primo de Rivera, 259-1: Carta de la Unión de Fabricantes de Alcoholes Vínicos de Cataluña al Excmo. Sr. Presidente del Directorio Militar (Vilafranca del Penedès, 21.9.1923).

[26] AHN, Fondos Contemporáneos, Presidencia de Gobierno Primo de Rivera, 259-1: Carta de los Sindicatos de Exportadores de Vinos de Tarragona, Reus y Vilafranca del Panadés al Excmo. Sr. Presidente del Directorio Militar (Tarragona, 11.12.1923).

and vociferously opposed the winegrowers' demands such as crop declarations and wine distribution licences "since, without in any way avoiding fraud, they would hinder the transactions and cause pointless damage to trade and to the producers themselves".[27]

When the decree on Alcohols was passed on 1 September 1924, the Spanish winegrowers had still to create their confederation. The anger caused by the new law once more prompted the winegrowers to mobilize. Large meetings were held demanding the repeal of the decree, the implementation of crop declarations and wine distribution licences, the removal of taxation on wine and other measures to prevent wine depreciation. The winegrowers' mobilization culminated in the Valencia assembly in November 1924, and the foundation of the Federation of Winegrowers of Levante mentioned above. The CNV was created immediately afterwards, and in 1925 the winegrowers' associations of Navarre, la Rioja, La Mancha and Aragón were set up and became members (CNV, 1929).

But the new organization was not much more successful. The Wines and Alcohols Act of April 1926 created a National Office on Wine (*Junta Vitivinícola*) responsible for setting alcohol prices and for adopting measures to regulate the wine and alcohol trade. Winegrowers had only one representative in this office, and they soon realized that the decisions favoured industrial alcohol manufacturers and wine merchants and exporters. In 1928, the Winegrowers' Association of Aragon proposed the withdrawal of the CNV representative, "since this body, though created to uphold the law, constantly violates it with agreements that are contrary and prejudicial to wine production".[28] The winegrowers called it the National Office *against* Wine ("*Junta Antivitivinícola*") and the Association of Wine Alcohol Manufacturers (*Asociación de Fabricantes de Alcohol Vínico de España*), even called for its closure (Fernández, 2008). So the first attempts to start joint management of the viticultural policy in Spain under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (Pan-Montojo, 2002) proved highly unsatisfactory for the winegrowers.

As in other Western countries, the difficulties of the 1930s pushed the authorities to increase their intervention in agriculture, and under the Spanish Second Republic the regulatory mechanisms of agricultural markets were consolidated and strengthened (Pan-Montojo, 2008: 129). Following the example of the French Parliament, in 1932 a Wine Statute was passed as an all-embracing set of measures to regulate the domestic

[27] *Revista de alcoholes, azúcares e industrias derivadas*, 2.1925.
[28] *La Vinicultura Española*, 1.1.1928.

wine market,[29] but many of them merely continued and systematized earlier legislation (especially the 1926 Wines and Alcohol Act), and the winegrowers were not satisfied (Fernández, 2008). The Wine Statute set up a new central wine agency (*Instituto Nacional del Vino*), entrusted with the task of "studying and proposing to the government any measures to encourage the consumption of wine, rationalize its production, revalue the product of the vine and its derivatives, and trying to harmonize the diverse interests affected".[30] Winegrowers were represented in this agency, which continued the work of the former National Office on Wine – but so were industrial alcohol manufactures, wine merchants and exporters, whose interests often clashed head on. Again, it was difficult to reach agreements that were satisfactory for winegrowers, who called it "National Institute *against* Wine", echoing the name they had given its predecessor (Fernández, 2008: 134).

Examining Spanish wine policy in the interwar period, Fernández (2008) concludes that winegrowers did not achieve their goals because the Spanish government wanted to protect the interests of wine exporters and the national sugar industry. In spite of their intense mobilization and even though a significant part of the legislation was favourable to their interests, the laws were not properly enforced, and the winegrowers' lobby turned out to be a failure. In France, on the other hand, the government was much more sensitive to the winegrowers' demands; in fact, wine policy was so clearly producer-oriented that viticulture was described as "the spoiled child" of agricultural policy (Augé-Laribé, 1950: 173).

Why were the positions of the Spanish and French governments so different? In section 2 we saw that winegrowers in both countries faced similar difficulties, despite the disparities in the level of the specialization in wine growing and the size of the wine sector. In section 3 we saw the responses of the winegrowers in the two countries to these difficulties, in terms of mobilization and organization to defend their interests. Taking all this into account, in this last section I will try to assess the differences in the state intervention in wine markets and the reasons for them. According to Sheingate, government capacity in agricultural policy is a function of the relationship between interest groups and the state as mediated by institutions (Sheingate, 2001). In this paper I argue that the differences in the viticultural policies of France and Spain in early

[29] In France, the "Wine Statute" was passed on 4 July 1931. In Spain it was first a decree (8 September 1932) and later an act passed on 26 May 1933.
[30] *Estatuto*, 1933: art. 14 (Robledo, 2012: 122).

twentieth century can be best understood by looking at: a) the strength and cohesion of the winegrowers' lobby, b) the winegrowers' relationship with political parties, and c) the state's ability to respond to their demands. These three factors were intrinsically related, as we will see below.

a) The strength and cohesion of the winegrowers' lobby

Unlike Spain, where the winegrowers' lobby was slow to get off the ground, in France the sector organized very early on. In 1887, the wine producers of the Midi had already created the *Syndicat des Viticulteurs* in order to avoid the renegotiation of the trade agreement with Italy and to increase tariffs (Pinilla & Ayuda, 2002). They also created the powerful CGV, and even though they failed in achieving restrictions on the free-tariff entry of Algerian wine, they had an influence on viticultural policy for decades.

French wine producers were not a homogeneous group: producers from Bordeaux, Champagne and Burgundy were more concerned with the quality of their wines (and soon achieved protection under regional appellations), while winegrowers from the Midi were more concerned by the wine adulteration and the importation of table wine from Algeria or Spain. However, as we have seen, the Midi concentrated a large share of the total production under very homogeneous conditions,[31] and the CGV provided powerful leadership in the organization of the winegrowers' interests; it was able to achieve agreements based on clear and widely-supported demands.

Catalan winegrowers followed the mobilization of the neighbouring Midi very closely and tried to imitate their organization; but, due to its lower degree of specialization, its smaller size and its smaller share of the national wine sector, the Catalan leadership was substantially weaker. The UVC membership had increased rapidly after its foundation: delegations were created in more than 200 localities and membership reached 20,000 in 1911, but from then on it fell progressively to 19,402 in 1914, 17,237 in 1917, and only 3,412 in 1933.[32] When the CNV was finally founded in 1924, the UVC was no longer Spain's most important winegrowers' organization, and in

[31] The geographical concentration of the wine production was a key factor for achieving tariff protection in America: California in the US, Mendoza in Argentina, Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil (Pinilla & Ayuda, 2002). See also Simpson, 2011.

[32] *El Vinyater*, 2.1911; *Resumen de Agricultura*, 5.1914; Ministerio de Fomento, *Memoria estadística social-agraria de las entidades agrícolas y pecuarias en 1 de abril de 1918*, Madrid, 1918; *Boletín Oficial de la provincia de Barcelona*, 1.7.1933.

1927 the president acknowledged its weakness (even the risk that it might disappear), and the need for its reorganization based on cooperatives.[33]

The spread of wine cooperatives was indeed an important factor for strengthening mobilization. The social interaction and cohesion they provided was particularly important for the representation of their interests and their relations with the authorities. In France, local cooperatives were a sounding board for CGV campaigns; with the bottom-up expression of winegrowers' interests through the cooperatives, the initiatives led by the CGV had a greater impact.[34] In the Midi, the wine cooperative movement developed early on, with strong encouragement from the CGV: "while remaining independent of them, particularly in financial terms, the CGV has continued to spread them by outlining their benefits through lectures in villages, and encouraged them, emphasizing, in its reports, their utility and successful results. Its local delegations form the natural nucleus of all these initiatives" (Caupert, 1921: 111).

Its counterpart in Catalonia followed the same strategy. From its earliest days, the UVC encouraged the creation of cooperatives in every municipality. They formed a far more effective relational network than the local delegations, and they could avoid the risk that the UVC ran of becoming a mere showcase (indeed, although the UVC's annual conferences brought together hundreds of winegrowers, no fluid, dynamic bond was established between the board and the membership).

The cooperative movement developed quite early in Catalonia, and more than 80 winemaking cooperatives were in operation in the 1930s, accounting for nearly three quarters of the Spanish total (Planas, 2013). Nevertheless they were far fewer in number than in the Midi, where 340 wine cooperatives were founded from 1919 to 1939 (Lachiver, 1988: 498). France had 827 wine cooperatives operating in 1939, compared with only around a hundred in Spain before the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. The difference in size of the cooperative movement had a major effect on the winegrowers' ability to mobilize; the higher the number of cooperatives, the greater the support they could achieve, which was essential in order to lobby the government.

Last but not least, in Catalonia there was a significant social divide among the winegrowers. Many of them were tenants who cultivated the vineyards thanks to a type of contract known as *rabassa morta*, which had been widespread in Catalonia since the

[33] *La U.V.C.*, 15.2.1927.
[34] See Pesche, 2000: 52-54, on the role of cereal cooperatives and the *Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé.*

eighteenth century. Under this contract, the tenants (*rabassaires*) had the right to use the land until most of the planted vines had died, as indeed happened due to the phylloxera crisis. After the replantation, the *rabassaires* fought to improve their contractual terms and to gain access to land ownership. In the early 1920s the agricultural syndicate *Unió de Rabassaires* was created to fight for their rights, and their struggle with landowners became a source of social unrest and a major political issue in Catalonia until the Spanish Civil War (Giralt, 1965; Balcells, 1968; Carmona & Simpson, 1999; Pomés, 2000). These tenants were certainly very concerned about the problem of wine prices, but their priority was to improve their contractual terms as a way to reduce the rent they had to pay on the land.[35] In general, then, the collective response of Catalan winegrowers was hampered by the social division between *rabassaires* and landowners, who had different goals and strategies, and this significantly weakened the cohesion of the winegrowers' lobby.

b) The winegrowers' relationship with political parties

In France, the winegrowers' mobilization had an immediate political effect. For many years under the political influence of the landlords and notables, in the late nineteenth century French winegrowers had begun to contribute to the increasing power in rural areas of the Radical party, and later of the Socialist party. These two parties tried to retain the support of small winegrowers, defending their interests in Parliament and calling for state intervention in wine markets. Throughout the period the Midi was politically left-wing: before the First World War the Radicals dominated, and later the Socialists, and sometimes the two parties formed alliances. The Radical government's use of force in the Midi revolt (1907) and the involvement of the Socialist party (SFIO) in the winegrowers' movement extended the socialist influence in these southern *départements.*

Though critical of large landownership, the SFIO supported small or medium-sized landownership, which it saw as a working tool for family producers. It accepted state intervention in wine markets to avoid speculation, stabilize prices and achieve a fair revenue for small producers through market regulation. In fact, in the late

[35] In 1935 the president of the *Unió de Rabassaires* admitted that the organization had focused its activity on the contractual system, but he claimed that it had seen the necessity to expand it to the economic field, "in order to obtain fair prices for agricultural products", even leaving contracts as a secondary issue (Puig i Vila, 1935: 21).

nineteenth century, Jean Jaurès had already stated that increasing living standards and independence of peasants was a national priority: "We must put them in a situation of such independence that they become the unshakeable foundation of a regime of freedom".[36] At the Congress of Nancy (1907), the SFIO clearly declared its support for small landownership, and in the 1930s the Socialist deputies were still "in favour of the defence of agricultural workers, but also of small producers or landowners whose interests are also threatened by the development of capitalism" (Lynch, 2002: 115). In order to defend the small winegrowers' interests, the SFIO proposed not a social revolution, but state intervention in wine markets in order to stabilize prices. The initiative of creating the *Office National du Vin* and regulating the wine market by fixing wine prices and output came from the SFIO, although many parliamentarians and winegrowers' associations opposed the project.

Nevertheless, the relationship between the Socialist party and the CGV was not an easy one. The Socialist party supported the agricultural workers' strikes until 1906. During the Midi uprising (1907) many Socialists were reluctant to accept the interclass character of the revolt and warned workers and small vineyard owners of the risk of being co-opted by the large winegrowers leading the movement, even though one of the main leaders was the Socialist mayor of Narbonne, Ernest Ferroul (Frader, 1991: 146). As the CGV had been founded as a result of the regional protest, Ferroul became its president, but on its board there were a number of large landowners (most of them conservatives or moderate Republicans), since the number of votes in the CGV was proportional to the importance of the interests represented (measured in hectares of vineyards or hectolitres of wine for winegrowers, and in taxes paid for traders). Consequently, the CGV was soon denounced by some union leaders as a corporatist and antidemocratic organization, and Ernest Ferroul branded a "*collaborateur de classe*". But by minimizing the importance of class differences in the defence of viticulture, Ferroul managed to rally those who were unconvinced by the CGV. After Edouard Barthe's election (1910) and with his control of the Socialist federation of the Hérault *département*, the relationship between the SFIO and the CGV became smoother. Barthe, who was elected continuously from 1910 to 1940, was the undisputed leader of the deputies from the Midi, whose activities in parliament earned them the name "*députés du vin*" (Bagnol, 2010). When Barthe was elected leader of the viticultural

[36] Jean Jaurès, "La bourgeoisie républicaine et les paysans", *La Dépêche*, 7.7.1889, in: Chatriot, 2012: 5.

parliamentary group (1919), it had nearly 250 members and was the most important of its kind in the French parliament.

In Spain, on the other hand, the political voice of the winegrowers was very limited. The Spanish Socialist party (PSOE) had much less influence than its French counterpart, and it was mainly concerned with the agricultural workers' interests (González de Molina, 2011; Cruz Artacho, 2011; Cobo Romero, 2012). Until the Second Republic (1931-1936), leftist Republican parties were too weak to give support to winegrowers (Pomés, 2000), and in the 1930s Catalonia was the only region where winegrowers received clear support from the regional government, led by the Republican Left party (ERC). ERC supported the tenants (*rabassaires*), and its priority was to change the contracts for land use; however, as in the rest of Spain, the landowners managed to block agrarian reforms.

In the Spanish parliament the winegrowers had far less influence than in France. Some of the members were large landowners with viticultural interests and others were businessmen from the wine sector; but small-scale winegrowers – who, as in France, formed the majority of the wine producers – had very few representatives, and so it was more difficult to defend their interests. There were several attempts to create a parliamentary group that could present a joint defence of the wine sector, but it was hampered by disagreements. In 1921, the main promoter, the Catalan Josep Zulueta, threw in the towel, lamenting that the associations had not achieved the required level of development and that the old landowners continued to exert an excessive influence in an undemocratic political system (Pan-Montojo & Puig, 1995: 265). The viticultural parliamentary group was not created until ten years later, in August 1931, under the Second Republic. At the end of that year, the group comprised 76 members from different parties, a figure that rose to 101 in 1932 and 150 in 1935 (Fernández, 2008), although they never managed to work closely together.

c) The state's ability to respond to the winegrowers' demands

State agricultural policy depends not only on the strength of the interest groups and their relationship with political parties, but also on "the development and design of agricultural bureaucracies, the definition and scope of departmental jurisdictions and the location of decision-making authority in the agricultural policy" (Sheingate, 2001: 29). The degree of democracy in the political system clearly influences the government's

agricultural policy (Solberg, 1987) and the structure of the agricultural bureaucracy that exists to implement it.

In Spain, the capacity of the Parliament to address the wine crisis was hampered by the influence of the large landowners, by rigged elections, and by the lack of strong parties. Furthermore, the bureaucracy was ponderous; the organisms to implement regulatory measures were weak and funding was insufficient. Consequently, law enforcement, which was the winegrowers' main demand, was also more difficult: even though some laws clearly favoured wine producers (for example, alcohol taxation, which favoured wine alcohol), the lack of control in the wine market meant that the legislation was difficult to implement. The real influence of the different interest groups was, then, much more balanced than the legislation might suggest (Pan-Montojo & Puig, 1995). Significantly, in a country where agriculture was the main economic sector, the Ministry of Agriculture did not exist as a single institution until 1933; in France, the ministry had been created in 1881. As for the regulation of the wine markets, the non-existence of a Ministry of Agriculture had major consequences, since the measures introduced by different ministries frequently clashed with each other.[37]

In contrast, in France the creation of a national agricultural bureaucracy was a key part of the strategy to consolidate the Third Republic (Cleary, 1989). French Republican politicians were aware of the need to retain political support in the countryside; as they lacked party organizations capable of mobilizing the peasants, they used the local administrative officials (that is, the mayors) and promoted a network of agricultural organizations with close relations with the state (Sheingate, 2001: 44). With the foundation of the *Société nationale d'encouragement à l'agriculture* the Republicans tried to challenge the conservative *Société des Agriculteurs de France* and its powerful *Union des syndicats agricoles de France*, with the creation of another network of local agricultural syndicates (Barral, 1968).

After the experience of state intervention over prices during the First World War French winegrowers called for further intervention to control prices and production in the interwar period, in order to counter the depreciation of their product. For example, the use of industrial alcohol in beverages had been prohibited during the war; as the demand for explosives increased and some important distilling regions were invaded, the French government had to confiscate industrial alcohol and take full control of the

[37] "Conferencia de M. J. Mª Rovira en la Asociación de Agricultores de España", *La cuestión de los alcoholes en España*, Barcelona, 1924.

alcohol industry. The law of 30 June 1916 finally reserved all industrial alcohol for the state, leaving only natural alcohol (distilled from wines and other fruit) for beverages. French winegrowers fought to extend the prohibition after the war, and in 1918 a *Commission des carburants nationaux* was created and Édouard Barthe was elected president. The definitive prohibition was achieved after the Béziers Agreements in 1922 between the CGV and the representatives of the industrial distillers and beetgrowers of northern France. Édouard Barthe brought the agreement to Parliament and, supported by some three hundred members, proposed a bill (passed on 28 February 1923) that required fuel importers to buy industrial alcohol (10% in volume of the fuel passed through customs) and then to mix it and produce fuel. As industrial alcohol had an outlet, beet-alcohol producers agreed to the monopoly of wine alcohol in the beverage market, and a strict division between industrial and natural alcohol was established during the interwar period (Warner, 1960: 123-136).

In 1924, Édouard Barthe was appointed president of the *Commission des Boissons*, a parliamentary commission entrusted with overseeing all measures related to beverages. He held the presidency of other important committees related to viticulture such as the *Commission interministérielle de la viticulture*, *Comité national de propagande en faveur du vin, Comité du carburant national, Conseil supérieur des alcools, Fédération des stations uvales, Office national des combustibles liquides, Commission du contrôle des vins, Institut national des appellations d'origine* and the *Office international du vin* (Sagnes, 1986: 63-64; Bagnol, 2010).

In France, the winegrowers' organizations not only amplified the voice of small producers in politics, but also supplied government administrators with information, assistance, and political support in the implementation of agricultural policy. This intervention was critical, given the increasingly technical nature of agricultural policy and also in order to allay fears of state encroachment. Since 1907 the CGV performed regulatory functions on behalf of the government, as it had its own agents to prosecute fraud in winemaking. Later on, in the interwar period, the CGV and other winegrowers' organizations were well represented in the public organisms in charge of wine market regulation, and the *Statut de la Viticulture* reinforced the role of the CGV and other associations in the implementation of wine policy (Sheingate, 2001: 94-96).

The radical measures enacted in France to regulate the wine market in the 1930s (including taxes on high yields, prohibition on planting vines and irrigation, compulsory distillation, blockage of harvests in the farms for release at stipulated intervals and even

the pulling-up of vines) clearly favoured small-scale viticulture at the expense of medium-sized and large winegrowers. The CGV and other winegrowers' associations opposed some of them, and Édouard Barthe and other "*députés du vin*" had to look for support by creating a new winegrowers' organization, the *Ligue des Petits et Moyens Viticulteurs*.

These measures of state intervention were highly controversial, and it is difficult to measure their effectiveness in avoiding overproduction (Cellier, 1938; Warner, 1960; Lachiver, 1988; Tracy, 1989).[38] Possibly reducing production via *laissez-faire* practices would have been an alternative; but it would have harmed the winegrowers, and, as we have seen, the viticultural policy in France was the result of a strong alliance between them and the state. Protection for winegrowers was certainly costly. Many regulatory measures were discriminatory and were introduced in an improvised fashion and in response to political pressures. But maybe this protection contributed to consolidate small landownership and to preserve liberal democracy in France. This was not the case in Spain or elsewhere in Europe in the 1930s.

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